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In a repeated​ game, deterring entry A. is not a rational strategy if money is lost fighting the first potential entrant. B. cannot form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. C. is not possible. D. may require losing money fighting the first potential entrant.

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Answer:

D. May require losing money fighting the first potential entrant.

Step-by-step explanation:

In this form of gaming, or in this game theory, it is said to be played over and over and could possible be in a probability form that is why that possibly, as a player, you may require loosing money fighting the first potential entrant.

Fighting the first entrant, possibility of cooperating means that their could be a possible compromise in order to carry on accepting a payoff over a certain period of time, knowing that if we do not uphold our end of the deal, our opponent may decide not to either.

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User Bitsabhi
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