5a) The Tiebout model posits that people will "vote with their feet", or move between jurisdictions, until they find the optimal balance between taxes and public goods. This means that governments that provide high levels of public goods without charging exorbitant taxes will attract more residents, thereby increasing their tax base and creating a virtuous cycle. This process, according to the model, will lead to the efficient provision of public goods.
However, with the unique structure of California's property tax system, this dynamic could be disrupted. As moving to a new jurisdiction could result in increased taxes due to higher assessed values, people may be discouraged from moving. This could make residents less likely to relocate to jurisdictions with a better balance of taxes and local services, potentially undermining the efficiency of local public good provision predicted by the Tiebout model.
5b) Since under California's system, property taxes can increase significantly when people move, it's likely that residents may be less inclined to relocate to different neighborhoods or cities. This structure of taxes may potentially lead to less socioeconomic mixing within communities, as people with similar income or wealth levels tend to reside in the same area.
Compared to states that reassess property values (and thus, property taxes) frequently, it's probable that communities in California will be more homogeneous. The property tax system, in effect, serves as a deterrence to mobility that could otherwise promote a greater mixing of income or wealth levels within communities. This suggests that the policy could indirectly promote socioeconomic segregation within communities.